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Abstract. When used in requirements processes and tools, personas
have the potential to identify vulnerabilities resulting from misalign-
ment between user expectations and system goals. Typically, however,
this potential is unfulfilled as personas and system goals are captured
with different mindsets, by different teams, and for different purposes. If
personas are visualised as goal models, it may be easier for stakeholders
to see implications of their goals being satisfied or denied, and designers
to incorporate the creation and analysis of such models into the broader
RE tool-chain. This paper outlines a tool-supported approach for finding
implicit vulnerabilities from user and system goals by reframing personas
as social goal models. We illustrate this approach with a case study where
previously hidden vulnerabilities based on human behaviour were iden-
tified.
1 Introduction
Personas are fictional characters that represent archetypal users, and embody
their needs and goals [4]. Personas are the product of research with represen-
tative end-users, so designing for a single persona means designing for the user
community he or she represents. By facilitating design for one customer voice
rather than many, personas have become a popular User Experience (UX) tech-
nique for eliciting and validating user requirements.
Personas can be a useful addition to requirements processes and tools when
‘building security in’. If we identify that a persona experiences physical or cog-
nitive burden while completing a task then its performance might not be as
intended. Steps might be omitted or the task altered to achieve an end more
conducive to the persona’s own goals, irrespective of whether or not the intent
is malicious.
Personas can inspire the identification of security vulnerabilities. In prac-
tice, they usually do not. Design processes prioritising agility provide little time
for using personas for anything besides validating stakeholder value has been
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achieved. Even if we assume UX and security engineers collaborate, personas
are not always used in the ways envisaged by designers [12], while security en-
gineers might primarily focus on requirements for security mechanisms. Given
their differing concerns and perspectives, problems may not be found even when
these are indicated during the collection or analysis of user research data.
Personas, as user models, can be integrated into Security Requirements En-
gineering (RE) practices and tools, but they need to be built and presented
differently. This may make it easier for stakeholders to identify the security im-
plications of user goals being satisfied or denied. Goal models in languages like i*
[29] and the Goal-oriented Requirements Language (GRL) [1] provide a founda-
tion for this improved integration; they represent the intentions and rationale of
social and technical actors, their inter-relations, and alternative strategies giving
a space for variability accommodation, including that of user types. Approaches
like Secure Tropos [21] and STS-ml [23] show how goal models can be used in
the early stage of design to find vulnerabilities. However, they are role-focused
whereas people are expected to align to one or more ways to achieve predefined
goals.
To integrate personas into Goal-oriented Security Requirements Engineering,
we need to answer two research questions. First, how can persona creation be
leveraged to construct goal models (RQ1)? Second, how can existing goal mod-
elling approaches and RE tools, with minimal changes, be constructed to reveal
implicit vulnerabilities – vulnerabilities that may be present when dependees fall
short of their responsibility to deliver dependums [16] – without burdening de-
signers with additional conceptual knowledge (RQ2)? User research and threat
modelling can be time-consuming and cognitively intensive activities that might
happen separately or in parallel before, during, or after other Requirements En-
gineering activities. It is, therefore, necessary to loosely couple these goal models
such that other design models can evolve orthogonally with minimum disruption
to existing processes and tools.
In this paper, we present a tool-supported approach for finding implicit vul-
nerabilities by reframing personas as social goal models. The remainder of this
paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we consider related work in social
goal modelling and security, personas, and usable & secure Requirements Engi-
neering upon which our approach is based. In Section 3, we present the processes
and tool-support algorithms that underpin our approach before describing its ap-
plication to an industrial control systems case study example in Section 4. We
discuss the implications of our work and potential limitations in Section 5, before
concluding in Section 6 by summarising the contributions of our work to date,
and directions for future work.
2 Related Work
2.1 Finding vulnerabilities using social goal modelling
Social goal modelling languages like i* capture the modelling of dependencies,
where a depender actor depends on dependee actor for some resource depen-
dum. Actors become vulnerable when they rely on dependees for dependums.
Analysing chains of these dependencies can help us understand how vulnera-
ble these actors are [28]. Moreover, when such models capture a socio-technical
system of actors and resources, they can also highlight potential system vul-
nerabilities resulting from inconsistencies between an organisation’s policies and
working practices [17].
In previous work examining the use of social goal modelling to support Secu-
rity Requirements Engineering, Liu et al. [16] considered how legitimate actors
might use their intentions, capabilities and social relationships to attack the sys-
tem, and how dependency relationships form the basis of exploitable vulnerabil-
ities. The idea of dependencies as implicit vulnerabilities was further elaborated
by Giorgini et al. [13], who indicated that dependency relationships can also
capture trust relationships where dependers believe dependees will not misuse a
goal, task or resource (Trust of permission), or a trustee believes dependees will
achieve a goal, execute a task, or deliver a resource (Trust of execution).
Elahi et al. [5] incorporated vulnerabilities into goal models to link knowl-
edge about threats, vulnerabilities, and countermeasures to stakeholder goals
and security requirements. Vulnerabilities are considered as weaknesses in the
structure of goals and activities of intentional agents, which can be propagated
via decomposition and dependency links. The introduction of vulnerabilities was
added on the basis that including security and non-security elements on a sin-
gle model makes models clearer and facilitates model discussion [27]. However,
while this approach supports the specification of vulnerabilities, it provides lit-
tle support for eliciting them. This still requires a priori knowledge of potential
system weaknesses or threat models that could take advantage of them. More-
over, Moody et al. [20] found that the graphical complexity of i* is several times
greater than a human’s standard limit for distinguishing alternatives. As such,
approaches that increase the complexity of the i* language are likely to hinder
rather than improve the understandability of social goal models, particularly for
novices.
2.2 Personas for security
UX professionals have long used personas to bring user requirements to life, and
there has been some been work within the Requirements Engineering community
on using personas to add contextual variability to social goal models, e.g. [22].
The merits of using personas to explicitly elicit security requirements was
identified by Faily et al. [8], who showed how the use of personas could show the
human impact of security to stakeholders who have never met user communities
represented by personas. In recent years, there has also been additional interest in
the RE community on the use of personas to engage stakeholders when validating
requirements [3], and how data used to construct personas can have some security
value. For example, Mead et al. [19] demonstrated how the text from personas
built on assumptions about attackers (Personae Non Gratae) could be mined
to identify potential threat models and identify gaps between a designer’s and
attacker’s model of a system. However, Mead et al. focuses on the identification of
threats to a system rather than vulnerabilities that might arise from interactions
between personas and the system.
2.3 IRIS and CAIRIS
IRIS (Integrating Requirements and Information Security) is a process frame-
work for designing usable and secure software [7]. The framework incorporates a
methodology agnostic meta-model for usable and secure requirements engineer-
ing that supports the complementary use of different Security, Usability, and
Requirements Engineering techniques. Personas are integrated into this frame-
work, which uses the KAOS language for modelling system goals [15], obstacles
that obstruct the satisfaction of these goals, dependency associations between
roles, and relationships between tasks, system goals, and the roles responsible
for them. The framework is complemented by CAIRIS (Computer-Aided In-
tegration of Requirements and Information Security): a software platform for
eliciting, specifying, automatically visualising, and validating secure and usable
systems that is built on the IRIS meta-model. By making explicit the links be-
tween different security, usability, and software models using IRIS, and providing
tool-support for automating generating and validating these models, IRIS and
CAIRIS can put one model in context with another. For example, we recently
demonstrated how data flow taint could be identified in data flow diagrams
within CAIRIS by putting these diagrams in context with other software and
usability models [11].
Previous work has shown that, if personas are constructed using qualitative
data analysis, the results of this analysis can be framed as argumentation models
[9], and the elements of these models can be re-framed as goals and soft goals in
social goal models [6]. Not only does this make it possible to automatically gener-
ate goal models from argumentation models, some assurance is also provided for
both the basis of user goals and the broader impact of satisfying these goals on
other system elements. Subsequent work has demonstrated how these concepts
can lead to generation of elaborate GRL compatible goal models [10]. However, a
weakness of this approach is its reliance on additional tool-support (jUCMNav),
and the limited support of traceability links between the goal modelling platform
and its originating data should the GRL model evolve; such evolution is likely
as different stakeholders make sense of this model. Subsequent refinement of the
jUCMNav model could lead to additional effort by analysts to ensure the goal
model and its foundational CAIRIS models are synchronised.
3 Approach
3.1 Conceptual model
To reframe a persona as a social goal model, our approach relies on aligning
concepts from IRIS with concepts from social goal modelling. A review of the
complete conceptual model, which is described in more detail in [7], is beyond the
scope of this paper. We do, however, summarise this model concept alignment
in Figure 1, which we provide further rationale for in the sub-sections below.
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Fig. 1. UML class diagram of IRIS and user goal concepts
Personas and Persona Characteristics Our approach has only a minimal
impact on existing IRIS concepts. We assume personas consist of multiple per-
sona characteristics. These characteristics are attributes of persona behaviour;
they can be considered as arguments for persona behaviour, and are grounded
in one or more grounds, warrants, and rebuttal elements. These elements (doc-
ument references) are factoids that can be drawn from a variety of primary and
secondary data sources (external documents) such as interview transcripts, ob-
servational notes, and web sites. Further details on these concepts can be found
in [7].
User Goals User goals represent the intentional desires of actors, where ac-
tors are personas. This definition is inline with the definition used for goals by
the social goal modelling community, e.g. [28]. In our approach, user goals are
factoids expressed intentionally. Yu et al. [30] states that intentional properties
can only be inferred based on information obtained by indirect means, and that
the validity of these attributions can never be certain. However, a premise of
earlier work in the HCI community [9] is that the qualitative underpinnings of
personas can be validated, in the same way that qualitative models in general
can be validated. So, although validity can never be certain, our model provides
some level of assurance. Based on the satisfaction levels proposed by Amyot
et al. [1], user goals can be assigned a qualitative satisfaction level associated
with a quantitative score; these values are Satisfied (100), Weakly Satisfied (50),
Weakly Denied (-50), and Denied (-100).
Hard/Soft Goals and Beliefs Our approach inherits the idea of hard goals,
soft goals, and beliefs from i*. Hard goals are goals that can be measurably
satisfied, whereas soft goals are goals with less well-defined success criteria that
can be satisficed [26]. Beliefs capture facts important to stakeholders [1]; we use
these to capture beliefs held by personas. Beliefs are used irregularly in goal
models, and while it has been suggested these are used to capture the rationale
of designers during modelling rather than stakeholders [25], it has also been ac-
cepted that further exploration on the semantics of beliefs is needed [31]. The
grounding of personas and IRIS’ support for KAOS domain properties – that
can capture this form of rationale – means we need not explicitly incorporate
rationale meta-data into visual models. Therefore, beliefs can be safely used to
represent stakeholder beliefs without confusion. User goals are elicited from per-
sona characteristic elements based on the trust characteristic elicitation process
described in [10], where implied goal, soft goal or belief intentions form the basis
of user goals associated with the characteristic and its grounds, warrants and
rebuttal elements. These user goals are expressed as persona intentions.
Aligning System and User Goals As Figure 1 shows, IRIS supports the
concept of system goal, i.e. prescriptive statements of intent that the system
should satisfy throughout the co-operation of its intended roles in a particular
environment; this definition is based on the KAOS definition of goal [15]. Ob-
stacles obstructing these goals may be associated with vulnerabilities, thereby
connecting a goal view of a system with a risk view. IRIS also supports depen-
dency modelling of system goals, where a depender role depends on dependee
role for a goal or task dependum.
Until now, IRIS has not incorporated the notion of user goal because, as a
methodologically agnostic meta-model, discretion on how to map user goals and
expectations to system functionality is left to designers. However, in the case of
a goal dependum, we should be able to capture the need for user goals to be
satisfied to satisfy system goals. Consequently, our approach now adds an explicit
traceability link between user goals that personas might have, and KAOS goals
that a system needs to satisfy. This traceability link could be bi-directional, as
we do not prescribe the elicitation of one type of goal before the other. For
example, an analyst may capture system goals to satisfy a persona’s goals, so
may wish to indicate the system goals that address these user goals. Conversely,
in a pre-existing system model, an analyst may wish to examine the implication
of system requirements on the value a persona wishes to achieve. Our approach
precludes neither possibility, and facilitates subsequent model validation checks.
3.2 Modelling user goal contributions
To visualise personas as goal models, our approach extends the i* Strategic
Rationale model [28] in two ways. First, we align persona characteristic elements
with contribution links. Contribution links indicate the desired impact that one
system element has on another [1]. As user goals are part of the broader socio-
technical system being modelled, it is reasonable to assume that one user goal
can contribute to another. In our approach, argumentation elements form the
basis of means/end contribution links between user goals, i.e. where one user goal
is the means for another user goal’s end. Links are annotated with two additional
pieces of information: (i) whether a link is a ‘means’ or an ‘end’ with respect to
the characteristic’s goal, soft goal or belief, (ii) an optional initial satisfaction
level, based on the qualitative values and quantitative scores specified in [1], i.e.
Satisfied (100) Weakly Satisfied (50), Weakly Denied (-50), and Denied (-100);
this is analogous to the setting of strategies in jUCMNav [1]. Second, as tasks
can have a security impact [5], completion of a task contributes to one or more
user goals.
Like other goal modelling languages, contributions have a qualitative value
corresponding to a quantitative score. We base these values on those used by
GRL: Make (100), SomePositive (50), Help (25), Hurts (-25), SomeNegative (-
50), and Break (-100). Make and Break contributions lead to the satisfaction or
denial of user goals respectively; similarly, Help and Hurt contributions help or
hinder satisfaction of user goals. SomePositive and SomeNegative values indicate
some indeterminate level of positive or negative contribution that exceeds helping
or hindering.
Algorithm 1: calculateGoalContribution
Input : goalName - the goal name,evaluatedGoals - list of goals already evaluated
Data: evaluatedGoals - names of user goals contributions have been calculated for, cts -
names of tasks contributing to user goal goalName, cgs - names of user goals
contributing to user goal goalName, linkScore - quantitative score for contribution of
user goal goalName to user goal cgName, contScore - product of linkScore and the
goal contribution score for user goal cgName
Output: score - contribution score
1 Function calculateGoalContribution(goalName,evaluatedGoals) is
2 score ← initialSatisfactionScore goalName;
3 if score = 0 then
4 isObstructed ← systemGoalObstructed goalName;
5 if isObstructed then
6 score ← -100;
7 else if goalName 6∈ evaluatedGoals then
8 evaluatedGoals ← evaluatedGoals + goalName;
9 cts ← taskLinks goalName;
10 while taskName ← cts do
11 score ← score + taskContributionScore taskName;
12 end
13 cgs ← goalContributions goalName;
14 while cgName ← cgs do
15 linkScore ← contributionLinkScore goalName cgName;
16 cgScore ← calculateGoalContribution cgName evaluatedGoals;
17 contScore ← linkScore × cgScore ;
18 score ← score + contScore;
19 end
20 score ← score / 100;
21 if score < -100 then
22 score ← -100;
23 else if score > 100 then
24 score ← 100;
25 end
26 end
27 end
28 return score;
29 end
The approach for calculating contributions is similar to Giorgini et al.’s label
propagation algorithm [14]. We implemented a recursive, forward propagation
calculateGoalContribution (Algorithm 1) based on the CalculateContribution al-
gorithm described in [1].
The setting of an initial satisfaction score (Line 2) based on the previously
described satisfaction level is permitted; this can override the calculated goal
score from related task and goal contributions. If the initial satisfaction score
has not been overridden and no system goals associated with a user goal have not
been obstructed (Lines 4–6), a contribution score can be calculated. To handle
goal contribution loops, i.e. where user goal x is a means to goal y , which is a
means to goal x , a list of visited goals is retained, and propagation occurs only
if a goal’s name is absent from the list (Lines 7–8). The contribution score is
calculated based on the tasks contributing to it (Lines 9–12), and the product of
each contributing goal and the contribution link strength (Lines 13–19). If the
score calculated is greater than 100 or less than -100, then the score is normalised
to a value within this range (Lines 20–25).
3.3 Identifying implicit vulnerabilities
Our approach for identifying implicit vulnerabilities, which is concerned with
dependencies between system rather than user goals, identifies two situations
where dependums might not be delivered. First, if a system goal dependum or
its refinements are obstructed and not resolved. Second, if the dependum or its
refinements are linked with denied user goals.
Algorithm 2 specifies how the presence of such implicit vulnerabilities might
be identified within a typical recursive system goal satisfaction algorithm. The
algorithm returns a value of true if the system goal g is obstructed.
The algorithm navigates the operationalising tree-based KAOS goal refine-
ments (Lines 11–27) to determine if there are obstruct associations between
refined goals and obstacles, and these obstacles have not been resolved, i.e. there
are no resolve relationships between obstacles and goals which address them.
However, this check can be shortcut should a linked user goal associated with
system goal g be denied, i.e. has a score less than 0. (Lines 3–10). Should this
check not be shortcut then the isObstacleObstructed algorithm (Line 19) deter-
mines whether a goal is obstructed. This algorithm returns a value of true should
one or more of the following conditions hold: (i) the obstacle or one of its obsta-
cle refinements are not resolved by a [mitigating] system goal, (ii) an obstacle
or one of its obstacle refinements are resolved, but the resolved goal has one or
more linked user goals which are denied. The isObstacleObstructed algorithm is
formally specified in [11].
Vulnerabilities within IRIS are defined as system weaknesses [7], but an im-
plicit vulnerability may not always be a system weakness. It may indicate some
inconsistency between what system roles and humans fulfilling might want and
need, or – as suggested by [24] – some level of human fallibility resulting from
roles that participate in too many dependencies as a depender. However, implicit
Algorithm 2: isGoalObstructed check
Input : g - the goal name
Data: ugs - names of user goals linked to system goal g, goals - names of system goals
refinements of g, obs - names of obstacles obstructing system goal g
Output: isObstructed - indicates if goal g is obstructed
1 Function isGoalObstructed(g) is
2 isObstructed ← false;
3 ugs ← linkedUserGoals g;
4 while ug ← ugs do
5 score ← calculateGoalContribution ug [];
6 if score < 0 then
7 isObstructed ← true;
8 break;
9 end
10 end
11 if isObstructed = false then
12 goals ← refinedGoals g;
13 if goals = ∅ then
14 obs ← obstructingGoals g;
15 if obs 6= ∅ then
16 isObstructed ← true;
17 else
18 while o ← obs do
19 isObstructed ← isObstacleObstructed o;
20 end
21 end
22 else
23 while g ← goals do
24 isObstructed ← isGoalObstructed g;
25 end
26 end
27 end
28 return isObstructed;
29 end
vulnerabilities can help make sense of different system models and, in doing so,
provide rationale for vulnerabilities feeding into risk models.
3.4 Tool-support
To show how this approach might be implemented in Requirements Management
tools more generally, we incorporated a new model type and supporting tools
into CAIRIS release 2.3.3.
We tool-supported the additional concepts and algorithms by introducing a
User goal visual model. This is based on the visual semantics of GRL, where a
rounded box represents a hard goal, a polygon with rounded corners represents a
soft goal, an ellipse represents a belief, and a dashed rectangle models the actor
boundary. In this model, actors are represented by personas. Further drawing
from the semantics used by GRL and jUCMNav, these nodes are coloured from
dark green to dark red corresponding with satisfaction values of Satisfied (100)
and Denied (-100); nodes with a value of None (0) are coloured yellow.
User goal models are generated automatically by CAIRIS using the same
pipeline process used to visualise other CAIRIS models. A declarative model of
graph edges is generated by CAIRIS; this is processed and annotated by graphviz
[2] before being subsequently rendered as SVG. This annotation stage includes
applying Algorithm 1 to user goal nodes to determine its score, and subsequent
colour. The CAIRIS model generation process is described in more detail in [7].
The algorithms described were incorporated into a Implied vulnerability model
validation check, which is applied to all KAOS goal dependency relationships
in a CAIRIS model. CAIRIS model validation checks are implemented inter-
nally within the relational database used by a CAIRIS model as SQL stored
procedures.
Fig. 2. Generated Excel workbook for entering user goals and contributions
As shown in Figure 2, we also extended CAIRIS to generate Excel workbooks
for capturing user goals and contribution links. Such workbooks are useful for
analysts wishing to contribute to user goal modelling via more familiar office
automation tools.
The generated Excel workbook contains UserGoal and UserContribution
spreadsheets, where edited cells for both are coloured green. The UserGoal work-
sheet is pre-populated with read-only data on the persona characteristic or doc-
ument reference name, its description, the persona it is associated with, and an
indicator to whether the reference corresponds to a persona [characteristic] or
document reference. When completing the worksheet, analysts should indicate
the intentional elements associated with the persona characteristics or document
references providing their grounds, warrants, or rebuttals. Analysts should also
indicate the element type (goal, softgoal, or belief), and the initial satisfaction
level using the dropdown lists provided. The source and destination cells in the
ContributionsSheet are pre-populated once user goals have been added in the
UserGoal sheet, so only the means/end and contribution links need to be set.
We further extended CAIRIS to allow the contents of these workbooks to be
imported into a pre-existing CAIRIS model.
4 Case Study
4.1 ACME Water Security Policy
We evaluated our approach by using it to identify implicit vulnerabilities as-
sociated with the security policy of ACME Water : an anonymised UK water
company responsible for providing clean and waste water services to several mil-
lion people in a particular UK region. The infrastructure needed to support such
a large customer base was substantial, amounting to over 60 water treatment
works, 800 waste water treatment works, 550 service reservoirs, 27,000 km of
water mains, 19,000 km of sewer networks, with over 1,900 pumping stations,
and 3,200 combined sewer outflows. This policy was modelled as a KAOS goal
model where each system goal represented a policy goal.
Four in-situ interviews were held with 6 plant operators, SCADA engineers
and plant operation managers at two clean water and two waste water treat-
ment plants. These interviews were recorded, and the transcripts analysed using
Grounded Theory. The results of this analysis are a qualitative model of plant
operations security perceptions. Using the persona case technique [9], we anal-
ysed the Grounded Theory model to derive a single persona of a water-treatment
plant operator, Rick, incorporating 32 persona characteristics, and backed up by
82 argumentation elements (grounds, warrants, or rebuttals).
The security policy goals were created by analysing existing documentation
about ACME’s existing information security policy and agreeing the scope of
the policy to be modelled with ACME’s IT security manager. Existing policy
documentation was analysed to elicit and specify a KAOS goal model of 82 pol-
icy goals, with a single high level goal (Secure operating environment) and, as
Secure operating environment
Secure network infrastructure Secure changes Access Control Secure Operating Systems Secure SLA Secure Roles Product security accreditation Secure backup Compliance audit Secure site Business activity asset
Fig. 3. High-level ACME Water security policy goals
shown in Figure 3, 11 refined sub-goals representing the different policy areas.
These goals and other security and usability elements of the operating environ-
ment were specified in a CAIRIS model; these included 2 personas, 11 roles, 21
obstacles, 9 vulnerabilities, 5 tasks, and 6 role-goal-role dependencies. 4
4.2 User goal model creation
To generate a user goal model based on Rick, we initially derived 104 user goals
and beliefs from both the persona characteristics and argumentation elements,
and 165 contribution links. The first two authors then reviewed the model to
de-duplicate synonymous user goals. For example, a Site protected user goal was
associated with a Copper theft document reference, as the intention implied was
that the site needed to be protected from this threat. However, we identified
a Site secured user goal associated with Physical and login security document
reference. As a result, we deleted the former user goal, and contribution linked
its user goals to Site secure. In parallel with the de-duplication of user goals,
we also added additional contribution links between user goals based on our
understanding of the persona and his intentions, where these contribution links
cross-cut persona characteristics. For example, on reviewing the persona charac-
teristics and their underpinning data, we noted that the Thieves ignore impact
user goal, which was associated with the Thieves do not care about their impact
characteristic, helped foster the belief that Personal safety is a hygiene factor ;
this belief was associated with the Personal safety is an infosec hygiene factor
persona characteristic. Following this analysis, the final model resulted in 93 user
goals and beliefs, and 205 contribution links.
Figure 4 shows the goal model generated by CAIRIS for Rick.
4 The case study CAIRIS model is available from https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.
3979236
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4.3 ICT awareness implicit vulnerabilities
Fig. 5. Alignment between ICT awareness system goal in KAOS goal model (inset)
and InfoSec communications perceived user goal in user goal model
From Figure 5, we identified a link between the InfoSec communications
perceived user goal (annotated as 2) and the ICT awareness system goal, which
is a refinement of the high-level Secure Site system goal.
The ICT awareness system goal indicates ICT partners should know how to
maintain equipment hosted in the secure areas and, as Figure 5 (inset) shows, this
system goal is already obstructed due to exposed and surplus equipment which
should not be present. Unfortunately, as Figure 5 also indicates, the related user
goal is also denied. The negative impact affects not only the perception of site
security, but also the perception the site is run efficiently; this corroborates the
obstacles found to be present in the system goal model. To reinforce this, the
belief Thieves steal anything (annotated as 1) was set to satisfied, which weakly
denied InfoSec communications perceived, further validating negative perception.
This highlighted the need for a new dependency where an IT security manager
depends on ICT partner to achieve the ICT awareness goal.
The limited security awareness means operators fail to see the connection
between misunderstanding authorisation, and wifi insecurity and site security,
due to their belief than an air-gap exists between wireless networks and industrial
control systems. Access controls on pump actions further supports the belief that
unknown applications are unauthorised. To explore this further, we associated
the Pump action restricted user goal with the Access Control system goal, and
added a dependency to indicate that plant operators depend on Information
Security managers for this goal. CAIRIS subsequently flagged a model validation
warning because a refined goalVendor passwords was obstructed, due to evidence
that vendors were using easily guessed default passwords for certain critical
components.
4.4 Validating vulnerabilities with implicit vulnerabilities
As indicated in Figure 1, obstacles can be associated with vulnerabilities to
capture the rationale for including vulnerabilities in subsequent risk analysis
activities. In the ACME Water model, an Exposed ICT Cabinets obstacle was
already associated with an Exposed cabinet vulnerability, but - given how divi-
sive resolving obstacles might be due to the architectural implications of their
resolution – we wanted to see if the user goal model of Rick provided a human
rationale for the obstacle’s presence.
Information Security Managers depend on Plant operators for a related In-
dustrialised secure cabinet system goal to ensure control systems are kept in
secure cabinets. On reviewing the user goal model and the tasks in the ACME
Water model, we noted that no-one was explicitly required to check these cab-
inets; instead, ACME Water trusted Rick to do this while discharging other
duties.
As Figure 6 shows, as part of a pre-existing Broken Instrument alarm task
(annotated as 3), we introduced help contribution links to Complex failure callout
and SCADA alarm responded because Rick completes the task to satisfy these
user goals. The task entails Rick being away from the safety of the control room
to respond to equipment alarms from these cabinets. Should these alarms fire
out of hours, the model shows that Rick might feel uneasy, particularly if he
thinks the alarm indicates intruders are stealing equipment. The potential for
Rick to skip the steps necessary to check these cabinets was corroborated in the
user goal model due the SCADA alarm responded being weakly denied.
5 Discussion and Limitations
While important for validating requirements, traceability is a weakness of lan-
guages like i* due to lack of guidelines for working with complementary models
[24]. Our approach addresses this traceability problem by drawing user goal rela-
tionships from the qualitative data analysis underpinning personas. However, a
Fig. 6. Contribution of Broken Instrument alarm task to user goals (left) and related
responsibility and dependency associations (right)
limitation of our approach is the restricted expressiveness of the generated user
goal models, particularly the lack of support for strategic dependencies between
user goals. Supporting dependencies between user goals may appear trivial from
a modelling perspective, but retaining traceability would necessitate changes to
how the qualitative data grounding personas is elicited and analysed to ensure
both personas and their collaborative aspects are encapsulated. Approaches for
creating such personas already exist, e.g. [18], and could provide a grounding for
subsequent modelling of user goal dependencies.
Another limitation of our work is that our case study considers only a single
persona. However, our initial results developing and evaluating the changes to
CAIRIS indicate that user goal models place little additional performance burden
to model validation checks. Because CAIRIS can incrementally import models
that overlay existing models, it is possible to incrementally add personas to a
baseline system to explore the impact of different personas interacting with each
other. Based on the process and performance of the tool-support, we believe
our approach scales to multiple personas too, but a more thorough performance
evaluation will be the subject of future work.
6 Conclusion
This paper presented an approach for reframing personas as social goal models
and, in doing so, using both the reframed and related models to find implicit
vulnerabilities. As a result, we have made two contributions addressing our re-
search questions in Section 1. First, we addressed RQ1 by demonstrating how the
user research used to construct personas can be leveraged to partially automate
construction of social goal models. Such user goals could be elicited either while
constructing personas, or afterwards - in which case the process of constructing
the user goal models helps further validate the personas and the data upon which
they are based. Second, we addressed RQ2 by illustrating how minimal contri-
butions to existing tool-support facilitate automation for both the identification
of implicit vulnerabilities from user goal models, and the validation of existing
system goal obstructions based on user goals and user goal contributions. Our
intention is not to replace traditional RE approaches to system and social goal
modelling, but to show how applying them in a different way can identify and
confirm potential security problems that might have otherwise remained hidden.
Future work will further examine persona characteristics and goal and task
attributes to evaluate fitness between persona and actors in goal models. For ex-
ample, some goals might require long-term attention span while others require
different social skills. The user model associated with these attributes will be
then used to simulate how different personas interact, and whether this leads
to insecurity. We will also investigate collaborative information gathering tech-
niques to capture goal models and their personas, e.g. through an interactive al-
gorithm driven by representative users providing satisfaction and denial weights,
and propagation options.
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